Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux…

…/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three
  having any substantive changes.

  These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid
  handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for
  AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or
  administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file
  explosion in the diffstat).

  Everything passes the selinux-testsuite"

[ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo
  Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy
  updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ]

* tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: constify nf_hook_ops
  selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
  lsm_audit: update my email address
  selinux: update my email address
  MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information
  selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches
  selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions
  selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined
  selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS
  credits: update Paul Moore's info
  selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets
  tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst
  LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.

CREDITS

@@ -2606,11 +2606,9 @@ E: [email protected]
 D: bug fixes, documentation, minor hackery
 
 N: Paul Moore
-E: [email protected]
-D: NetLabel author
-S: Hewlett-Packard
-S: 110 Spit Brook Road
-S: Nashua, NH 03062
+E: [email protected]
+W: http://www.paul-moore.com
+D: NetLabel, SELinux, audit
 
 N: James Morris
 E: [email protected]

Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst

@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ TOMOYO is a name-based MAC extension (LSM module) for the Linux kernel.
 
 LiveCD-based tutorials are available at
 
-http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/ubuntu10.04-live/
-http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/centos5-live/
+http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.8/ubuntu12.04-live.html
+http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.8/centos6-live.html
 
 Though these tutorials use non-LSM version of TOMOYO, they are useful for you
 to know what TOMOYO is.
@@ -21,35 +21,35 @@ How to enable TOMOYO?
 Build the kernel with ``CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO=y`` and pass ``security=tomoyo`` on
 kernel's command line.
 
-Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/ for details.
+Please see http://tomoyo.osdn.jp/2.5/ for details.
 
 Where is documentation?
 =======================
 
 User <-> Kernel interface documentation is available at
-http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/policy-reference.html .
+http://tomoyo.osdn.jp/2.5/policy-specification/index.html .
 
 Materials we prepared for seminars and symposiums are available at
-http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/?category_id=532&language_id=1 .
+http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/?category_id=532&language_id=1 .
 Below lists are chosen from three aspects.
 
 What is TOMOYO?
   TOMOYO Linux Overview
-    http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lca2009-takeda.pdf
+    http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lca2009-takeda.pdf
   TOMOYO Linux: pragmatic and manageable security for Linux
-    http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/freedomhectaipei-tomoyo.pdf
+    http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/freedomhectaipei-tomoyo.pdf
   TOMOYO Linux: A Practical Method to Understand and Protect Your Own Linux Box
-    http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/PacSec2007-en-no-demo.pdf
+    http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/PacSec2007-en-no-demo.pdf
 
 What can TOMOYO do?
   Deep inside TOMOYO Linux
-    http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lca2009-kumaneko.pdf
+    http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lca2009-kumaneko.pdf
   The role of "pathname based access control" in security.
-    http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lfj2008-bof.pdf
+    http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lfj2008-bof.pdf
 
 History of TOMOYO?
   Realities of Mainlining
-    http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lfj2008.pdf
+    http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lfj2008.pdf
 
 What is future plan?
 ====================
@@ -60,6 +60,6 @@ multiple LSM modules at the same time. We feel sorry that you have to give up
 SELinux/SMACK/AppArmor etc. when you want to use TOMOYO.
 
 We hope that LSM becomes stackable in future. Meanwhile, you can use non-LSM
-version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/ .
+version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.osdn.jp/1.8/ .
 LSM version of TOMOYO is a subset of non-LSM version of TOMOYO. We are planning
 to port non-LSM version's functionalities to LSM versions.

MAINTAINERS

@@ -9298,15 +9298,6 @@ F:	net/*/netfilter/
 F:	net/netfilter/
 F:	net/bridge/br_netfilter*.c
 
-NETLABEL
-M:	Paul Moore <[email protected]>
-W:	http://netlabel.sf.net
-L:	[email protected]
-S:	Maintained
-F:	Documentation/netlabel/
-F:	include/net/netlabel.h
-F:	net/netlabel/
-
 NETROM NETWORK LAYER
 M:	Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
 L:	[email protected]
@@ -9434,10 +9425,23 @@ F:	net/ipv6/
 F:	include/net/ip*
 F:	arch/x86/net/*
 
-NETWORKING [LABELED] (NetLabel, CIPSO, Labeled IPsec, SECMARK)
+NETWORKING [LABELED] (NetLabel, Labeled IPsec, SECMARK)
 M:	Paul Moore <[email protected]>
+W:	https://github.com/netlabel
 L:	[email protected]
+L:	[email protected]
 S:	Maintained
+F:	Documentation/netlabel/
+F:	include/net/calipso.h
+F:	include/net/cipso_ipv4.h
+F:	include/net/netlabel.h
+F:	include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h
+F:	include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_CONNSECMARK.h
+F:	net/netlabel/
+F:	net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+F:	net/ipv6/calipso.c
+F:	net/netfilter/xt_CONNSECMARK.c
+F:	net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
 
 NETWORKING [TLS]
 M:	Ilya Lesokhin <[email protected]>
@@ -12023,8 +12027,9 @@ M:	Paul Moore <[email protected]>
 M:	Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
 M:	Eric Paris <[email protected]>
 L:	[email protected] (moderated for non-subscribers)
-W:	http://selinuxproject.org
-T:	git git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux
+W:	https://selinuxproject.org
+W:	https://github.com/SELinuxProject
+T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
 S:	Supported
 F:	include/linux/selinux*
 F:	security/selinux/

include/linux/lsm_audit.h

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  * Author : Etienne BASSET  <[email protected]>
  *
- * All credits to : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * All credits to : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
  * All BUGS to : Etienne BASSET  <[email protected]>
  */
 #ifndef _LSM_COMMON_LOGGING_

include/linux/lsm_hooks.h

@@ -528,11 +528,6 @@
  *
  * Security hooks for task operations.
  *
- * @task_create:
- *	Check permission before creating a child process.  See the clone(2)
- *	manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
- *	@clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_alloc:
  *	@task task being allocated.
  *	@clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
@@ -1505,7 +1500,6 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*file_receive)(struct file *file);
 	int (*file_open)(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 
-	int (*task_create)(unsigned long clone_flags);
 	int (*task_alloc)(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
 	void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task);
 	int (*cred_alloc_blank)(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
@@ -1779,7 +1773,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head file_send_sigiotask;
 	struct list_head file_receive;
 	struct list_head file_open;
-	struct list_head task_create;
 	struct list_head task_alloc;
 	struct list_head task_free;
 	struct list_head cred_alloc_blank;

include/linux/security.h

@@ -318,7 +318,6 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
 int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
 int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
-int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
@@ -880,11 +879,6 @@ static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
 				      unsigned long clone_flags)
 {

kernel/fork.c

@@ -1569,10 +1569,6 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
 
-	retval = security_task_create(clone_flags);
-	if (retval)
-		goto fork_out;
-
 	retval = -ENOMEM;
 	p = dup_task_struct(current, node);
 	if (!p)

scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c

@@ -129,11 +129,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
 		struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
 		for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++) {
+			if (j >= 32) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Too many permissions to fit into an access vector at (%s, %s).\n",
+					map->name, map->perms[j]);
+				exit(5);
+			}
 			fprintf(fout, "#define %s__%s", map->name,
 				map->perms[j]);
 			for (k = 0; k < max(1, 40 - strlen(map->name) - strlen(map->perms[j])); k++)
 				fprintf(fout, " ");
-			fprintf(fout, "0x%08xUL\n", (1<<j));
+			fprintf(fout, "0x%08xU\n", (1<<j));
 		}
 	}
 

security/lsm_audit.c

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * common LSM auditing functions
  *
  * Based on code written for SELinux by :
- *			Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ *			Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
  * 			James Morris <[email protected]>
  * Author : Etienne Basset, <[email protected]>
  *

security/security.c

@@ -974,11 +974,6 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 	return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
 }
 
-int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
-{
-	return call_int_hook(task_create, 0, clone_flags);
-}
-
 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);

security/selinux/avc.c

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
  *
- * Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
  *	     James Morris <[email protected]>
  *
  * Update:   KaiGai, Kohei <[email protected]>
@@ -346,27 +346,26 @@ static struct avc_xperms_decision_node
 	struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
 	struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
 
-	xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep,
-				GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+	xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
 	if (!xpd_node)
 		return NULL;
 
 	xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
 	if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
 		xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
-						GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+						GFP_NOWAIT);
 		if (!xpd->allowed)
 			goto error;
 	}
 	if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
 		xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
-						GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+						GFP_NOWAIT);
 		if (!xpd->auditallow)
 			goto error;
 	}
 	if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
 		xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
-						GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+						GFP_NOWAIT);
 		if (!xpd->dontaudit)
 			goto error;
 	}
@@ -394,8 +393,7 @@ static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void)
 {
 	struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
 
-	xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep,
-				GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+	xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
 	if (!xp_node)
 		return xp_node;
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
@@ -548,7 +546,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 
-	node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+	node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
 	if (!node)
 		goto out;
 

security/selinux/hooks.c

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *
  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
  *
- *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
  *	      Chris Vance, <[email protected]>
  *	      Wayne Salamon, <[email protected]>
  *	      James Morris <[email protected]>
@@ -815,7 +815,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
-	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
 		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
 
 	if (!sbsec->behavior) {
@@ -1303,6 +1305,7 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
 		case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
 			return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
 		case SOCK_DGRAM:
+		case SOCK_RAW:
 			return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
 		}
 		break;
@@ -2317,6 +2320,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
 	int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
 	int rc;
+	u32 av;
 
 	if (!nnp && !nosuid)
 		return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
@@ -2325,24 +2329,40 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 		return 0; /* No change in credentials */
 
 	/*
-	 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
-	 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
-	 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
-	 * of the current SID.
+	 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
+	 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
+	 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
+	 * the old and new contexts.
 	 */
-	rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
-	if (rc) {
-		/*
-		 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
-		 * NNP:  Operation not permitted for caller.
-		 * nosuid:  Permission denied to file.
-		 */
+	if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition) {
+		av = 0;
 		if (nnp)
-			return -EPERM;
-		else
-			return -EACCES;
+			av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
+		if (nosuid)
+			av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
+		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+				  SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
+		if (!rc)
+			return 0;
 	}
-	return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
+	 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
+	 * of the permissions of the current SID.
+	 */
+	rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
+	if (!rc)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
+	 * NNP:  Operation not permitted for caller.
+	 * nosuid:  Permission denied to file.
+	 */
+	if (nnp)
+		return -EPERM;
+	return -EACCES;
 }
 
 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

security/selinux/include/avc.h

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * Access vector cache interface for object managers.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
  */
 #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_
 #define _SELINUX_AVC_H_