diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 086a2c3aaaa044..d1dc39af6771eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -114,6 +114,28 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 
 	/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
 	addq	$(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	mov	%rax, %rdi
+	mov	%rax, %r14
+
+	addq	phys_base(%rip), %rdi
+
+	/*
+	 * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
+	 * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
+	 * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
+	 * the next RET instruction.
+	 */
+	call	sev_verify_cbit
+
+	/*
+	 * Restore CR3 value without the phys_base which will be added
+	 * below, before writing %cr3.
+	 */
+	 mov	%r14, %rax
+#endif
+
 	jmp 1f
 SYM_CODE_END(startup_64)
 
@@ -192,15 +214,6 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	/* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */
 	addq	phys_base(%rip), %rax
 
-	/*
-	 * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
-	 * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
-	 * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
-	 * the next RET instruction.
-	 */
-	movq	%rax, %rdi
-	call	sev_verify_cbit
-
 	/*
 	 * Switch to new page-table
 	 *